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RODRIGO PRAINO
Introduction
According to the famous salad-bowl formulation, the United States is made 
up of millions of people with distinctive individual ethnic backgrounds. 
Each one of those people has an enormous and abstract assemblage of 
cultural norms, habits, traditions, and preferences that has been handed 
down from generation to generation. Yet some of these backgrounds 
constitute the “majority” while others are too often simply dismissed as 
“different” from that majority. This truism of American life must have 
important political consequences. In their seminal work Voting: A Study 
of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, Bernard Berelson, Paul 
F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee (1954) devoted great attention to 
the political impact of ethnic groups (illustrated by concepts such as the 
“Italian vote”), drafting an analysis that is arguably among those founda-
tional to the entire subdiscipline of American political behavior (63). With 
the development of American politics as a field of study, scholars began 
to analyze more general questions related to political behavior, seemingly 
forgetting about the importance of ethnic-based politics, whereas scholars 
interested in ethnic studies, on the other hand, dedicated their attention 
to issues deemed more pressing—where discrimination was more blatant, 
crude, and widespread. As David A. Richards (1999, 2) pointed out, 
however, the relegation of some important groups to a less studied—and 
therefore implicitly less important—ethnic cohort suggests “the existence 
of a major disciplinary problem in the methodology of ethnic studies—
the uncritical perpetuation of the silencing that such studies usually so 
rightly condemn.” Ultimately, this article seeks to stimulate interest in 
the study of ethnicity and ancestry as important determinants of political 
behavior in the United States, thus helping to fill an immense gap within 
American political science. Its hypothesis is that membership in a specific 
ethnic group—Americans of Italian ancestry—is an important determinant 
of political behavior in that it influences and shapes the legislative voting 
behavior of sitting members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and 
so the beginning of this task will be analyzing the legislative behavior of 
Italian/American1 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, specifi-
cally between 1972 and 2006.
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In the following pages I will show that membership in this ethnic and/
or ancestry group leads to political moderation, due to the fact that individ-
uals who belong to these groups are accustomed to compromising between 
their own culture and the “dominant” culture. In order to test this hypoth-
esis, it will be necessary to integrate concepts, elements, and findings from 
two disparate sets of political analyses: congressional electoral studies and 
ethnic politics. In the first part of the work, I review some of this relevant 
literature. I then proceed to present some descriptive data showing the 
political importance of Italian/Americans as an ethnic group in the United 
States and describing the legislative voting behavior of Italian/American 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the third section I present 
the data set I use to test my hypothesis, while in the fourth part I specify 
my statistical model and briefly discuss the results. In conclusion, I present 
some avenues for future research.
Ethnicity, Representation, and Congressional Polarization
American scholars interested in questions of race, ethnicity, and political 
representation have shown that, in general, constituents tend to express 
higher levels of satisfaction when their elected representative belongs to 
their own racial or ethnic group (Tate 2001). The existing literature suggests 
that individuals can benefit in various ways from “descriptive representa-
tion”; that is, being represented by someone who shares one or more of their 
physical or personal characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, gender, or occu-
pation (cf. Pitkin 1967). On a structural level, this representation enhances the 
legitimacy of both the polity as a whole, by proving that it does not discrimi-
nate against certain groups, and of the minority group within the polity, by 
proving its members’ ability to rule (Mansbridge 1999, 628). As Raymond 
E. Wolfinger (1966, 47) put it, “When the first Irishman was nominated 
for alderman in the mid-nineteenth century, this implied a recognition of 
the statesmanlike qualities of all Irishmen.” On a more functional level, it 
creates a potential for improved communication between constituents and 
elected officials and promotes the full articulation of the specific demands 
of the minority group, due to a higher level of trust and understanding of 
the needs of the group (Mansbridge 1999, 628). According to some (Preuhs 
2006, 598), “descriptive representation leads to political responsiveness,” 
and, in some cases, its importance outweighs that of traditional deter-
minants of legislative behavior, such as party allegiance. The number of 
studies that argue that the race and/or ethnicity of elected legislators deter-
mines to different degrees their behavior while in office is astonishing, even 
though none focus on Italian/Americans specifically (e.g., Nelson 1991; 
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Swain 1993; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Bratton 
and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001, 2002; Preuhs 2001). Most of these analyses 
show that members of a particular racial or ethnic group are more successful 
than their nongroup member counterparts in including in the legislative 
agenda certain issues important to the minority group they represent. 
If membership in a racial or ethnic group determines the behavior of 
legislators in terms of the issues they choose to involve themselves with, 
the larger question that remains unanswered is whether their legislative 
behavior is different from that of other legislators tout court. According to 
social and developmental psychologists, membership in an ethnic group 
leads to the acquisition of a set of qualities broadly defined as “bicultural 
competence.” According to Teresa LaFromboise, Hardin L. Coleman, and 
Jennifer Gerton (1993), bicultural competence is expressed in terms of 
acquisition of, among other things, processes of bicultural efficacy, commu-
nication ability, and role repertoire. Bicultural efficacy refers to the ability of 
living “effectively, and in a satisfying manner, within two groups without 
compromising one’s sense of cultural identity” (199, 404). In other words, 
it emphasizes the ability of members of the ethnic group to utilize negotia-
tion in order to resolve conflicts (cf. Berry 2005). Communication ability 
and role repertoire refer to the skill of members of ethnic groups to express 
themselves in different contexts and utilize a wide range of culturally and/
or situationally appropriate behaviors (LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton 
1993, 405–407). Thanks to this particular bicultural competence, members 
of ethnic groups display particular ability and willingness to interact with 
members of other groups in order to achieve their goals (Phinney 1992). 
Consequently, they possess great “ability to achieve positive develop-
mental outcomes in the context of adversity” (Lee 2005, 36). 
In addition, existing research in psychology shows that European 
Americans tend to utilize compromise as their “conflict style” more than 
minority and racial groups (Ting-Toomey et al., 2000). It is still unclear 
why European Americans are more prone to compromise than other 
groups beyond a slim reference to the strong cultural identity of European 
Americans. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to acknowledge 
the existence of this empirical difference, as it creates an expectation that 
Italian/Americans will, as a group, be prone to compromise as a method 
for conflict resolution.
In brief, psychologists provide us with a theoretical framework that 
seems to expect that individuals belonging to ethnic groups possess a general 
attitude toward compromise and negotiation based on bargaining and 
mutual understanding. They also show some empirical evidence pointing 
toward an additional and specific inclination of European Americans 
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toward resolving conflicts via compromise. Consequently, it is reasonable 
to assume that, while serving in Congress, individuals belonging to certain 
ethnic groups will tend to exhibit legislative behavior—at least in part—
informed by their more general ethnic-based behavior. When it comes to 
the issue of congressional polarization, their bicultural competence may 
very well be the cause of a more moderate behavior. Previous research has 
obtained mixed results while exploring the relationship between social 
identity and legislative voting behavior. In fact, while gender seems to be a 
quite important determinant of behavior (cf. Frederick 2009, 2010), personal 
religious affiliation seems to not influence the legislative voting behavior of 
members of Congress (MCs) (cf. D’Antonio, Tuch, and White 2008; Cann 
2009), even though the religion of their constituents can be of enormous 
significance (cf. Green and Guth 1991). Given the current state of the existing 
literature, assessing the empirical relationship between membership in an 
ethnic group and legislative voting behavior becomes extremely important.
In the past few years, considerable attention has been dedicated 
by American scholars (Bond and Fleisher 2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder, 
and Stewart 2001; Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Theriault 2006; Jones and 
McDermott 2009) to the issue of partisan polarization, especially within the 
U.S. Congress. Increasing polarization came through the replacement of 
less-polarized MCs by ideologically more extreme candidates and through 
the adaptation of the remaining members (Theriault 2006). If, according 
to Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2001, 18), “the Republicans [ . 
. . ] have taken a marked turn to the right while the Southern Democrats 
have become increasingly like their Northern counterparts,” Sean M. 
Theriault (2006, 483) shows that progressive polarization occurred in 
both parties and in both chambers of Congress by explaining that “if the 
Democratic senators have taken one step toward their ideological home, 
House Democrats have taken two steps, Senate Republicans three steps 
and House Republicans four steps.”
Even though the existence of an ongoing phenomenon of congressional 
polarization is considered an indisputable fact within the recent literature 
(e.g., Sinclair 2006), its causes are surrounded by much more disagreement. 
In fact, while some (e.g., Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 
2000) emphasize the change in the role of political parties through ideas 
such as “conditional party government,” others tend to stress the effects 
of institutional reforms within Congress itself (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Theriault 2008). Still others turn to constituents, arguing that redis-
tricting and gerrymandering create ideologically extreme districts (Carson 
et al., 2004), that increased income inequality causes polarization (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), or simply that voters themselves move further 
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toward extremes (Bond 2001). However, constituent-based explanations 
tend to be rejected by analyses of policy preferences of voters (Fiorina, 
Abrams, and Pope 2005). 
Regardless of the cause of congressional polarization, the fact that such a 
phenomenon occurs along partisan lines remains a key element in virtually 
all these analyses. In other words, political extremity or moderation are, 
by definition, measured along partisan ideological divides. In particular, 
scholars (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001) find an “ebb and flow” 
of responsiveness to district-specific preferences and national party alle-
giance by MCs between 1874 and 1996. They argue that, in the second half 
of the twentieth century, MCs who espoused the most radical views of their 
political party at any given point in time tended to receive less electoral 
support in the successive election. Similarly, Brandice Canes-Wrone, David 
W. Brady, and John F. Cogan (2002) expand these preliminary findings 
and demonstrate that roll-call support of political parties in general is an 
important electoral determinant; specifically, it has a negative impact on an 
MC’s future electoral results and that, consequently, the probability of an 
MC retaining office decreases with roll-call support of his or her political 
party both in marginal and dependable districts. 
Within this literature, the unanswered question is what else, other than 
partisan allegiance, may influence the more or less extreme political behavior 
of elected MCs? One of the most interesting answers to this question is Jeffrey 
Ladewig’s (2010) retrospective roll-call voting theory. Ladewig develops a 
comprehensive member-specific incremental theory of legislative voting 
that unveils the link between electoral performance and congressional 
polarization. According to Ladewig (2010, 509), MCs “have a retrospective 
temporal lens to their decision-making calculus,” in that they focus “their 
future utility, reelection maximization, on their own past electoral success.” 
In other words, the more votes an MC receives, the more ideologically 
extreme he or she tends to become in the subsequent congressional session. 
Ladewig’s study makes it possible to successfully model and predict how 
extreme an individual MC will be, according to his or her specific career 
pattern. Now that a theory of congressional polarization that goes beyond 
the idea of party support and defection exists, I believe it is possible to 
control for the ethnic-based determinants of congressional polarization.
Italian /Americans as an Ethnic Group
Even though there are virtually no political analyses of Italian/Americans 
as an ethnic group within the field of American politics focused on recent 
years, the political importance of the group is often recognized by political 
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scientists. Not only, as already mentioned above, do older studies make 
numerous references to Italian/Americans (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and 
McPhee 1954), but some more recent analyses also sporadically use the 
ethnic group as a control variable (e.g., Meier and Holbrook 1992). In the 
United States, Italian/Americans constitute the second most numerous non–
Anglo-Saxon ancestry group (cf. Praino 2012). Even more important, there 
are districts in the country where almost 40 percent of residents self-identify 
as Italian/Americans. The political consequences of this fact alone are of 
great importance. A recent historical study of the city of Utica, in upstate 
New York, for instance, shows that Italian/Americans have controlled an 
ethnic-based political machine of national influence in the area for almost 
a century (Bean 2010). Italian/Americans in this instance seized control of 
the Republican Party apparatus when the party was dominant in the early 
twentieth century, while other Italian/Americans controlled the Democratic 
Party during the New Deal and the years of Democratic ascension. 
Shifting the attention from the presence of Italian/American constitu-
ents within a district to the electoral success of Italian/American candidates 
for public office, some descriptive data reveal that it is not merely a coinci-
dence that both gubernatorial candidates in the state of New York in 2010 
were Italian/Americans. Within all elections held for the U.S. House of 
Representatives between 1972 and 2006 twelve states2 have seen the victory 
of an Italian/American candidate in over 10 percent of their elections. 
Twenty-seven states elected at least one Italian/American representative in 
the same period. Overall, Italian/American candidates won 499 electoral 
races in the U.S. House of Representatives in this period, a number that 
represents almost 10 percent of all races. Among these victories, 231 were 
located in the East, 109 in the West, 101 in the Midwest, and 58 in the South. 
Italian/American MCs do not differ sociologically from their non–
Italian/American colleagues in any meaningful way. Representation is 
comparable in terms of gender, education, age at first election, military 
service, and partisan affiliation.3  Figure 1 graphically represents an index 
of the average political extremism4 of members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives between 1972 and 2006. On average, Italian/American 
members of the House seem to be less extreme than their non–Italian/
American counterparts. There is a clear trend toward higher levels of polar-
ization for both Italian/American and non–Italian/American members, 
starting especially at the end of the 1980s, that is consistent with the litera-
ture on congressional polarization. However, there seems to be a correlation 
between Italian ancestry and moderation among members of the House.
Figure 2 shows how extreme the “most extreme” Italian/American and 
non–Italian/American members of the House were during the same period, 
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Figure 1. Index of Average Political Extremism for Italian /American and Non–Italian /American 
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972–2006.
Figure 2. Index of Political Extremism of the “Most Extreme” Member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1972–2006.
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and it seems that Italian/Americans are less extreme than their non–Italian 
counterparts. Clearly, information about one individual does not constitute 
proof of a larger trend. However, for most of the time period analyzed, the 
most extreme Italian/American was substantially more moderate than his 
or her non–Italian counterpart, and that is an interesting piece of descrip-
tive evidence.
Data and Methodology
In order to test my hypothesis that membership in this ethnic group leads 
to political moderation, I gathered data pertaining to all U.S. House of 
Representatives elections between 1972 and 2006, as compiled by the Office 
of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. The data set was coded 
in such a way as to allow the tracking of individual members of the House 
and the congressional districts where they were elected. To this data, I 
added district-specific data on the socioeconomic composition of every 
congressional district for the period of time analyzed. All socioeconomic 
data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. Finally, I added to the data set 
Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) NOMINATE scores. NOMINATE scores are 
a measure of the ideology of individual MCs based on the analysis of their 
roll-call vote. It assumes a value that ranges from –1 (most liberal) to 1 (most 
conservative). Originally, Poole and Rosenthal developed two separate 
sets of scores, the W-NOMINATE scores and the DW-NOMINATE scores. 
The former allow for a comparison of the ideology of a single member 
across congresses but are not directly comparable between congresses for 
different members. The latter are directly comparable between congresses 
but fit the careers of individual members to a linear trend. Given the time-
series cross-sectional nature of the current data, any model built will be 
making comparisons across congresses and across members. Therefore, 
it was necessary to use a modified version of the NOMINATE scores 
developed by Timothy P. Nokken and Keith T. Poole (2004), the so-called 
NP-NOMINATE scores, which are estimated congress-by-congress and 
allow comparisons across congresses without fitting to a linear trend the 
careers of individual members of the House.
Thanks to the data described above, it was possible to build a number of 
variables that, according to the existing literature, are necessary to estimate 
a model of ideological extremism. Since, as explained above, Ladewig (2010) 
successfully modeled extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
the core of the model presented below is specified following his lead. 
Consequently, the dependent variable and some of the independent 
variables are calculated in accordance with his analysis.
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In order to gauge the level of political extremism a member of the House 
expresses through his or her legislative voting behavior, the dependent 
variable “Ideological Extremity” is the absolute value of the NP-NOMINATE 
score associated with each individual member of the House for every 
congress. It ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for perfect moderation, while 1 
stands for absolute extremism. The right-hand side of the equation specified 
for the model presented below contains a number of theoretically informed 
covariates in addition to the main independent variable of interest.
The main independent variable of the analysis is, of course, the variable 
“Italian/American MC.” It is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for all Italian/
American MCs 5 elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in the time 
period contained in the analysis and otherwise designated 0. According 
to the retrospective roll-call voting theory (cf. Ladewig 2010), the share of 
the vote received by MCs in the election immediately before the successive 
election is the most powerful predictor of their legislative voting behavior. 
Consequently, the variable “Vote Share” is the percentage of the total vote 
obtained by every candidate during the most recent election, normalized 
for presentation purposes to a 0-to-1 range. In order to control for partisan-
based explanations of political extremism, “Democrat” is a dichotomous 
variable, coded 1 for Democratic candidates and 0 otherwise. Finally, “Years 
in the House,” represents the number of years each MC has served in the 
U.S. House of Representatives at the time of the election and provides an 
effective control for the seniority of individual MCs, which has been shown 
to have an effect on the overall vote share incumbent candidates receive (cf. 
Praino and Stockemer 2012a, 2012b).
In order to control for institutional swings of legislative voter behavior 
(cf. Ladewig 2010), three institutional variables are also included in the 
right-hand side of the equation. “House Majority Party,” “Senate Majority 
Party,” and “Presidential Party” are all dichotomous variables coded 1 if 
the political party of the candidate is the majority party in the House, in the 
Senate, or holds the presidency, respectively, and 0 otherwise. These control 
variables capture any difference in extreme behavior by MCs according to 
the current status of their own political party.
Finally, the equation also contains some district-specific variables that 
attempt to control for peculiar conditions in each individual congressional 
district that might influence the behavior of the MC elected. “District 
Partisanship” is a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 1 and expresses 
the share of the presidential vote obtained in each congressional district by 
the presidential candidate of the member’s political party. This variable is 
a widely used proxy for the underlying ideological makeup of individual 
congressional districts (cf. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Praino, 
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Stockemer, and Moscardelli 2013). “Region South” is a dummy variable coded 
1 for all Southern congressional districts and 0 for the remaining districts.
In order to control for socioeconomic factors that may influence the legis-
lative behavior of individual MCs, the equation also includes variables that 
capture the socioeconomic makeup of individual congressional districts. 
Whereas the variable “Percentage of Young Voters (18–24)” is self-explanatory, 
“College-Educated Voters” is the percentage of people in each district over 
25 years of age who have at least a college degree. “Racial Minority Voters” 
is the percentage of people in the district who belong to any racial group 
other than “white.” All three variables were normalized for presentation 
purposes to a 0-to-1 scale. Finally, “Median Family Income (ln)” is the 
natural log of the median family income in each congressional district.
In addition to the three groups of variables discussed above, the right-
hand side of the equation also contains Congress-specific variables for each 
electoral year between 1972 and 2006. These are all dichotomous variables 
coded 1 for the specific election year and 0 otherwise, leaving the elections 
to the 110th Congress—the most recent election included in the analysis—
as the baseline, and they are important to capture any variation in the 
political extremity variable due to peculiar circumstances attributable to 
a specific legislature. They also capture any other more systematic differ-
ence between electoral cycles, such as the well-known differences between 
midterm elections and presidential elections, or any effect due to concur-
rent gubernatorial or any other kind of elections.
Specification of the Model and Results
Utilizing the “Ideological Extremity” variable as the dependent variable, the 
results presented below were calculated through the specification of a statis-
tical model containing all the variables described above in the right-hand 
side of the equation. The existing literature suggests that the ideological posi-
tioning of individual MCs tends to be quite stable over time (cf. Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997). Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that ideologically 
extreme MCs will tend to be, on average, consistently extreme, just as more 
moderate members will tend to be consistently moderate, notwithstanding 
their personal movement through the moderate-extreme continuum due 
to certain conditions. This situation creates potential for some statistical 
complications, as a result of first-order autocorrelation. In fact, simple 
diagnostics performed on the data described above reveal the presence of 
autocorrelation within the error terms. In order to eliminate this problem, 
the model estimated below is a multilevel model (MLM) with the addition 
of random member-specific intercepts (cf. O’Connell and McCoach 2008).
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FIXED EFFECTS COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR
Intercept
Italian/American MC
Vote Share
Democrat
Years in the House
House Majority Party
Senate Majority Party
Presidential Party
District Ideology
Region South
Young Voters (18–24)
College-Educated Voters
Racial Minority Voters
Median Family Income (ln)
 0.08
 – 0.03 **
 0.06 ***
 – 0.07 ***
 – 0.00 ***
 0.03 ***
 – 0.01***
 – 0.01**
 0.00 ***
 – 0.05 ***
 – 0.24 **
 – 0.04
 0.10 ***
 0.03 **
 0.154
 0.015
 0.013
 0.006
 0.000
 0.003
 0.002
 0.002
 0.000
 0.008
 0.104
 0.042
 0.016
 0.014
RANDOM EFFECTS
Intercept
Residual
 0.02
 0.004
 0.001
 0.000
Log Likelihood
N
6,698.1
6,666
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Note: The Congress-specific variables are omitted from the table but included in the model specification.
Table 1. Ideological Extremity of MCs Elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972–2006
The results of the multivariate model contained in Table 1 largely 
confirm the pattern observed in the descriptive portion of this analysis. 
Even after controlling for a number of other factors known to influence 
and determine the spatial placement of MCs within the moderate-extreme 
continuum of legislative voting behavior, Italian/American MCs are less 
extreme than the average non–Italian/American MC.
Overall, the coefficients obtained by the MLM for the control variables 
largely confirm the findings of the existing literature on extremism in 
legislative voting behavior (cf. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; 
Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Ladewig 2010). Quite interesting are 
the results obtained by the socioeconomic, district-specific control variables—
most of them seem not to have an impact on the extremism of the legislative 
voting behavior of their district’s MC, but the presence of young voters and 
racial minorities within the district seems to have a very significant impact. 
Young voters seem to make the legislative voting behavior of MCs more 
moderate, but the presence of racial minorities within these districts has a 
very clear effect of resulting in a move toward extremes. If the data show that 
Italian/American MCs are less extreme in their legislative voting behavior 
than non–Italian/American MCs, this deserves some further thought.
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First of all, the small coefficient reported by Table 1 for the variable 
“Racial Minority Voters” must be contextualized. In fact, the model predicts 
that, keeping everything else constant, in a district where the absolute 
majority of voters (50.1 percent) belong to racial minority groups, its MC’s 
“Ideological Extremity” score will be 0.050 points larger than those of other 
MCs. Such variation is, therefore, quite large and important, in comparison 
to the coefficients obtained by both my MLM and by models estimated by 
others within the existing literature (e.g., Ladewig 2010).
Conclusion
This article shows that Italian/American MCs are, on average, more 
moderate in their legislative voting behavior than their non–Italian/
American counterparts. This moderating impact of belonging to this ethnic 
group stands even after controlling for all the factors that the existing liter-
ature has shown have great influence in determining how extreme MCs 
are and/or become in time. This finding seems to provide solid empirical 
evidence confirming the theoretical expectation expressed by social 
psychologists that individuals belonging to an ethnic group are inclined 
to resolve conflicts utilizing compromise due to their bicultural compe-
tence. This adds to both the literature on congressional polarization and 
the literature on the relationship between social identity and legislative 
voting behavior. In fact, the results discussed above show that there is a 
direct relationship between ancestry and ethnicity and legislative voting 
behavior. However, at least two separate considerations are in order here.
First, as this study is based on only one ancestry/ethnic group, its gener-
alization properties merit some further thought. While the theory utilized 
here in order to explain the moderation of Italian/American MCs (i.e., the 
idea of bicultural competence) is not specific to Italian/Americans, other 
ancestry/ethnic groups may or may not present similar behavioral patterns. 
In fact, the degree of cultural integration and assimilation, the specific 
history of discrimination within the larger society, as well as the socioeco-
nomic status of the group as a whole may all create different outcomes. 
Consequently, scholars should expand the type of analysis presented here 
to other ancestry, ethnic, and even racial groups.
Second, this analysis deals with the dichotomy of moderation/extremism. 
While extremely important, it also presents several limits. Future studies 
should expand from this narrow, unidimensional approach to policy 
analysis, adding some nuance to the infinite possible differences across 
policy positions of individual MCs. A complete analysis of the roll-call vote 
of Italian/American MCs would also allow us to find out how exactly the 
Italian /American Members of Congress and Congressional Polarization • 121 
idea of bicultural competence works within Italian/American legislators 
and how exactly an Italian/American MC determines his/her placement 
within a multitude of possible policy positions. These are all important 
issues that cannot be answered at the present moment.
The analysis presented above, while largely confirming the results of 
previous works, also sheds some light on the currently understudied rela-
tionship between race, ethnicity, ancestry, and congressional polarization. 
In fact, the idea that race, ethnicity, and ancestry may play very different 
roles in determining whether MCs are more or less extreme in their 
legislative voting behavior needs further and more systematic analysis. 
The results presented above show that while MCs belonging to a partic-
ular ethnic/ancestry group (i.e., Italian/American MCs) tend to be more 
moderate than all other MCs (i.e., non–Italian/American MCs), congres-
sional districts with elevated numbers of racial minorities tend to elect more 
extremist MCs. This work seeks to build some interest in this largely unex-
plored area of an important and growing branch of congressional research, 
while concomitantly attempting to begin filling the immense gap within 
American politics created by the lack of interest in some ethnic groups and 
their political behavior.
Notes
1. The conscious choice throughout this article of uniting the terms “Italian” and “American” 
with the use of a slash—as in “Italian/American”—in opposition to the more common 
use of a hyphen—as in “Italian-American”—is the result of a very well known debate 
within the field of Italian/American studies, where the hyphen has been accused of 
visually perpetrating and widening the ideological gap between the dominant culture 
and the outside culture (cf. Tamburri 1991).
2. These states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania in the East, Minnesota in the Midwest, Mississippi in the South, and 
Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Wyoming in the West.
3. Italian/American women are just as underrepresented as non–Italian/American women. 
Most MCs from both groups are in possession of either a bachelor’s or a master’s (or 
other professional) degree. They all tend to get elected to Congress for the first time 
while in their mid-40s. Both groups have fewer and fewer MCs with military experience. 
They are almost evenly divided between the two major political parties.
4. This index was built utilizing Congress-by-Congress NOMINATE scores, or NP- 
NOMINATE (cf. Nokken and Poole 2004). In the section where I describe the variables 
of my model, I present a more complete explanation of what NOMINATE scores are and 
explain the reasons why I choose to utilize NP-NOMINATE scores instead of the better-
known DW-NOMINATE scores. For the moment, it is enough to explain that the index 
was built utilizing the absolute value of the NP-NOMINATE score associated with the 
term of individual candidates who were elected in the years in the figure. Therefore, the 
index ranges from zero (perfectly moderate) to one (perfectly extremist), regardless of 
political party affiliation.
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5. Coding this variable was a challenging task. While other minorities in the U.S. Congress have 
their own organizations—such as the Congressional Black Caucus or the Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus—and, therefore, it is easy to obtain a complete list of its members, Italian/
Americans currently do not enjoy such structures. I was able to obtain incomplete lists 
of Italian/American members of Congress for some of the most recent years through the 
National Italian American Foundation (NIAF). Some Italian/American members disclose 
their ancestry in their official websites, while others simply do not. After reviewing NIAF’s 
lists and the personal biographies and websites available, it was necessary to manually code 
everyone else based on their last names. While this method is not perfect, to my knowledge 
it is the most complete list of Italian/American members of the House that can be obtained.
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